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The Specter of Automated Creativity 
THE FIFTEEN YEAR OLD WORD, cybernetics, 
identifies not only the technological rev-
olution of automation, but a metaphysi-
cal revolution. Because of its breadth of 
conception, cybernetics seems to cut 
across all disciplines. This is not an un-
heard of event in the history of ideas. 
Newton summarized in one swoop man's 
knowledge of the universe, giving the 
world the metaphysics of materialism on 
which most of science rests today. Dar-
win's summary of the biological world 
under evolution caused a change of atti-
. tude in many fields. 
Cybernetics is, as are all metaphysical 
systems, a pseudoscience. But like evo-
lution or Einstein relativity, cybernetics 
is too new and still too useful to be ad-
mitted by most people to be pseudoscien-
tific. Astrology and phrenology, which 
still guide a not-insignificant number of 
people, also had their period of ascend-
ency. A metaphysical system's intellectual 
function is to stimulate the imagination 
through analogy and metaphor. But un-
wise use of analogy can be misleading. 
When a phrenologist equates lumps on 
the head with lumps in the personality, 
we call this unscientific. When an engi-
neer (or a physiologist) programs a com-
puter to do something never before done 
by a machine and says it simulates some 
human function, for example, thinking, 
is he really being scientific? Analogies 
are not in themselves bad, because if we 
are going to communicate at all, we must 
at some point use analogies. To say rela-
tivity and astrology are metaphysical 
does not mean they are the same and 
that one can be understood in terms of 
the other. A tremendous difference exists, 
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both logically and practically, between 
saying that two things are the same and 
saying that they seem to share some con-
ceptual attributes. 
The man-machine analogy of the cy-
berneticists has invaded the very organi-
zation of science. Arguments are pre-
sented not only for philosophic or scien-
tific discussion, but are used to acquire 
research funds and to increase the budg-
ets of bureaucracies. Anyone who says 
he needs a computer in his research or in 
his work has an immediate boost in 
status. These dreamers who say they can 
create a machine which thinks, learns, or 
makes decisions have forgotten one 
thing: no one knows how, or even why, 
man thinks, learns, or makes decisions. 
Nevertheless bold statements are made 
that machines can carry on such life 
functions. 
In the study of life and its character-
istics we have always been plagued with 
certain methodological problems. The 
cyberneticists have, in many instances, 
failed to realize they are not immune 
from these methodological considera-
tions. When a researcher studies an or-
ganism, he must impose conditions on 
it which modify the organism's func-
tioning. Since an organism is intimately 
related to its environment, the researcher 
can not know for certain what elements 
belong to the organism's functions and 
what belong to the environment. Fur-
ther, the researcher in setting up his 
study usually uses physico-chemical tools. 
ll9 
One should not be surprised then if 
his conclusions are stated in physico-
chemical terms. On the other hand, if 
one assumes a particular property is 
characteristic of some life process and 
then this property is discovered in an 
inanimate object, the conclusion is easy 
to make that the object is alive. The 
fallacy in this anthropomorphizing rests 
in the a priori assumption that certain 
characteristics are confined to a living 
organism. When the belief becomes com-
mon that an inanimate object is homol-
ogous to life, this mere assumption is 
then often accepted as fact: if one studies 
this object, information will be revealed 
about the behavior of life. The study of 
life processes by homologies, while more 
restrictive and hence subject to fewer 
"errors," can be just as spurious-as study 
by analogy.1 
No matter how critical one can be 
about the metaphysics of cybernetics, or 
its methodologies, no one can dispute 
that a machine has been injected into 
the fabric of our culture which can deal 
with matters on a new and different level 
even if it does not explain the reality of 
life. As a librarian I am supposed to be 
dealing with knowledge, organizing it so 
that the creators of knowledge can get 
reinforcements and so that the seekers 
of knowledge can find what is known. 
My purpose in pointing out the fallacy 
in man-machine analogies and homol-
ogies is to try to gain a perspective. If the 
engineer-physiologist really knew how 
the brain operated (which he implies 
when he states he has designed a ma-
chine which "thinks"), we would know 
how knowledge is created. If we knew 
how knowledge is created, we would 
have less difficulty organizing it. But the 
moment we use the word know ledge we 
have moved to metaphysical problems 
rather than to descriptions of life proc-
esses or machine components. Before we 
1 Arnold M . Ludwig, The Mystery of Life. (Spring-
field, Ill. : Thomas, 1961). pp. 7-11. Cf. also Mortimer 
Taube, Computers a11d Common Sense. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1961). 
start applying expensive computers to 
epistemic problems, I feel we should be 
aware of what is physics and what is 
metaphysics. 
vVhen we speak of knowledge in an 
academic tone of voice, what is usually 
meant is that which is found. in books 
and journals, i.e., communicable through 
symbols. The scientist is very rigid about 
this. He is little concerned. about the 
savoir faire, his aim is the savoir. The 
farmer can teach his son how to farm, 
but the agriculturist wants to know the 
why, he wants things defined and classi-
fied to see the relationships that exist. To 
the scientist events must be demonstrable 
through symbols, not just teachable. 
Whitehead was perhaps the first to 
point out that it was the yeasty Middle 
Ages that gave science this faith in words 
and logi~. 2 To the medieval Schoolmen 
know ledge was arrived at through the 
use of reason. Reason, for them, con-
sisted in logical argument. What could 
be explained logically was truth. They 
trusted logic because it could produce 
coherent systems. The fact that the sys-
tems may have had little acquaintance-
ship with what man actually experienced 
was unimportant. Their method of fur-
thering knowledge, from our point of 
view, was endless debate. These debates 
produced little new knowledge, but they 
did stamp the Western scholar with the 
necessity to adhere to Occam's razor. In 
modern terms this amounts to saying 
that any theory, to be of value, must 
state everything of interest with logical 
coherence and in the simplest way. "It 
is vain to do with more what can be done 
with fewer." 
The wordy debates of the Scholastics 
were supplemented in the sixteenth cen-
tury by the Baconian dictum: observe, 
observe, observe. The scientists began to 
confine themselves to talking only about 
the things they observed, nevertheless 
they still retained the Scholastic's atti-
2 Alfred North Whitehead, Adventure of Ideas. (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 121. 
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tude for logical coherence. Distrusting 
the medieval logomachies they were not 
content to use ordinary words; they re-
quired their explanations be reduceable 
to mathematical logic. When the ob-
served events of nature could be ex-
plained in mathematical symbols, they 
felt they had found a law of nature. The 
scientists did not abandon the reason of 
the Scholastics; they transferred it from 
man to nature. Man can be unreason-
able, but nature will never break one 
of her laws. To the materialistic scientist 
this means that all nature is continuous 
and operates under the same laws. This 
belief in the validity of man-made, math-
ematically-stated laws which express the 
reality of nature is with us today and 
governs the thinking of many scientists. 
Ledley writes, 
Ultrasonic receptors in bats enable these 
animals to fly successfully through a maze 
of wires in spite of total darkness and loud 
external noise ... some snakes have infrared 
energy detectors; and so forth. The biolog-
ical operation of such mechanisms is based 
on the same laws of physics and chemistry 
that the operation of transistors and other 
components devised by man is based on.3 
To say that the laws we have derived for 
transistor function are complete and thus 
universal or are the same as those for 
the auditory physiology of a bat is cer-
tainly debatable. 
Whether nature is actually all of a 
unity is an unanswerable question at 
present, and forty years ago physicists 
gave a mathematical proof that demon-
strates that the question will always be 
unanswerable. The question Heisenberg 
asked in 1925 which created a whole 
new science, quantum physics, was 
"What is it we really observe in an 
atom?"4 His answer amounted to this: 
since the physicist cannot see atomic par-
ticles, he must devise some measuring 
instrument that extends his senses. Atom-
8 Robert S. Ledley and Lee B. Lusted, "Biomedical 
Electronics: Potentials and Problems." Science 
CXXXV (1962), 198-201. . . ' 
4 Arthur Stanley Eddington, Philosophy of Science. 
(New York : Cambridge Univers,ity Pre!!s, ' 193~): . 
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tc particles are so small and so rapid-
moving that anything used to measure 
them also disturbs them-like trying to 
pin down a drop of mercury with a bull-
dozer blade. Since the atomic physicist 
is never quite sure what he has measured, 
his only recourse is to make many meas-
urements to build a statistical picture. 
But when the statistician creates such an 
entity as an "average man," there is no 
entity in nature which precisely fits the 
statistical description. The quantum 
physicist admits then that he can not 
predict what an individual atomic par-
ticle will do; the best he can do is to ex-
press atomic events in probability func-
tions. If it is true that all of matter is 
made of atomic particles, and all of our 
knowledge of them is statistical, do we 
have any assurance that any description 
in words or mathematics fits any actual 
event in nature? These scientists, and 
the number is not a crackpot minority 
group, who still insist that man can 
know the absolute workings of nature 
through mathematically coherent de-
scriptions, appear to be carrying on the 
tradition of the medieval Schoolmen who 
placed faith in their symbols while ig-
noring experienced fact. Like the engi-
neer-physiologist who thinks his com-
puter is a brain, this group assume the 
knowledge that is in books and journals 
is absolute. 
While the quantum physicist was dis-
covering that he had no evidence his sym-
bolic representations had any equivalence 
to specific events and experiences, other 
groups also got into this epistemological 
fray, the philosophers and linguists. They 
did not ask the question in quite this 
context, but, if mathematical language 
does not refer to facts of existence, what 
is the nature of other symbolic means of 
communication, e.g., language or pic-
tures.5 This is an important question be-
cause Shannon, the creator of the famed. 
information theory, has shown that any 
5 Walter M. Elsasser..._ The Physical Foundations of 
Biology . . (New, York: .rergamon, 1938), pp. 14-19. 
121 
symbolic representations, be they words, 
pictures, or electrocardiograms, can be 
reduced to a binary code which makes 
them handleable by a computer. One of 
the beauties of Shannon's theory is the 
complete quantification of information. 
Every "bit" of information has exactly 
the same value. This quantification, how-
ever, still leaves unanswered the meta-
physical question of what knowledge is 
that the "bit" of information carries. 
Here is the materialist's dream: a sys-
tem is defined which places all symbols 
on the same logical level. But what hap-
pens to communication when all symbols 
have the same value? What we get is a 
series of additions and multiplications of 
symbols and nothing more. Adding stone 
upon stone means adding stone upon 
stone. When and how do we recognize 
that a pyramid is formed? When does a 
physician know that a certain set of 
symptoms can be identified as a syn-
drome? 
As paradoxical as it may seem, the 
only way we can communicate meaning-
fully is to use words that are imprecise, 
or at least are many-leveled and many-
valued in explanatory power.6 The mean-
ing of symbols depends on the values we 
place on them and these values are de-
termined by our experiences. Since no 
two individuals can have precisely the 
same experiences, the meaning given a 
word, or a sentence, or a novel, will al-
ways vary as the human experiences vary. 
Imagine the difficulty in communicating 
if we couldn't change the significance of 
a word, e.g., electron, blood, or even jus-
tice, as our experiences expanded. While 
the process of communication helps us to 
secure, in some mysterious way, a: gestalt 
of our experiences, the words and sym-
bols are never all-inclusive. The most 
that can be said about knowledge con-
veyed through symbols is that it requires 
the agreement of men and is far from 
• Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 60. 
revealing the universal laws of nature in 
formal or mathematical language. 
To show just how far away we are 
from completely formalizing knowledge, 
i.e., classifying it into one complete sys-
tem, or to say it another way, removing 
all the ambiguity from our words, one 
need only examine the efforts of mathe-
maticians to reduce some simple games 
to a completely formalized process. Brown 
shows that the simple game of Goofspiel 
which is a matter of matching two suits 
of cards in a maximum of thirteen moves 
would require that 1 02o,ooo strategies 
would have to be considered by the third 
move in the game. 7 Shannon tells us that 
for a computer which can calculate one 
million moves per second to consider the 
aspects of the first move in a forty-move 
chess game would require JQ95 years. To 
illustrate how meta-astronomical such 
figures are, one of the more recent esti-
mates of the age of the solar system is a 
mere I 010 years. Even if engineers should 
increase the efficiency of computers by 
thousands of times, millions of years 
would still be required to play one game 
of chess. This may seem an impractical 
example since who wants to play chess 
with a computer anyway? But let us com-
pare the metabolism of a liver cell with a 
game of chess, anabolism on one side and 
catabolism on the other. Already we 
know that the number of biochemical 
pieces and their possible moves would 
make the game of liver cell metabolism 
more complex than chess. 
Since we do pia y chess and since we 
can understand something . about liver 
cell metabolism, we must get this under-
standing through some means other than 
formal logic. Understanding does not 
come by adding piece of information on 
piece of information. The conclusion is 
obvious: a computer that acts completely 
logical is not a creative device. A creative 
computer would have to replicate, not 
' George W. Brown, "Computation in Decision Mak-
ing," in I11!ormation a11d Decision Processes, ed. Rob-
ert E. Machol (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 
1-14. 
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simulate, a human being. Luckily nature 
has provided us with a more pleasurable 
way of replicating ourselves. 
I am not "agin" computers. Far from 
it. Cybernetics as a metaphysical disci-
pline is here to stay and to fight it would 
be like the fundamentalist arguing 
against evolution. My objection is the 
attitude proferred by so many that com-
puters are going to solve man's problems. 
Existing and future computers are not 
going to solve anything, anymore than 
did the invention of the wheel, or the jet 
motor. The computer, as a device, like 
all creations of homo faber, from the ax 
on up, is going to change ~omo sapiens 
way of living, not supplant him. No one 
today would say that the invention of the 
printing press relieved man of the neces-
sity for writing or of solving his prob-
lems. But the press did define new rela-
tionships between the governor and the 
governed and scholars with other schol-
ars. The computer is going to permit sim-
ilar realignments of social relationships 
and there is no doubt new definitions of 
human intercourse will have to be made 
because everything today seems to be 
"exploding" quantitatively. 
When anything increases quantitative-
ly, a point is reached where a qualitative 
change occurs. The sand on the beach 
piles up to form a dune, a dune grows to 
become a hill; the hill, given enough 
time, becomes a mountain. One does not 
climb a sand dune with the equipment 
used by a mountaineer. The electronic 
computer was constructed during the war 
to do the calculation of massive mathe-
matical data. But not all data man pos-
sesses has qualitative significance worth 
calculating. The mathematician Cauchy 
showed over a hundred years ago that 
any group of numbers can form a series, 
that is to say, once we have data reduced 
to numbers, we can always make an 
empirical formula. The necessity for 
good judgment in science, or in business, 
has not changed one iota because we 
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have a machine that can logically manip-
ulate numbers. 
In the area of judgment and decision-
making a new literature has also arisen. 
What has occurred in industry and the 
military where the theory of "decision 
processes" has been applied is again an 
instance of increased quantity producing 
new qualitative relationships. A simple, 
but dramatic example of how growth 
alters the needs of an industry is in air 
transport. One can go to an airline office 
and ask for a reservation. The clerk 
selects the card for your flight, punches 
out the date, presses a button and in a 
matter of seconds knows whether space is 
available for you. We can, if we want, 
assign all kinds of anthropomorphic 
qualities to this operation. We asked the 
computer a question, it consulted its 
memory, and it gave an answer. If the 
answer is that no space is available, we 
can say the computer has made a deci-
sion that you cannot go on this flight. 
More important than the question of 
whether computers make decisions is the 
fact that airlines are able to keep tabs 
on their flights with a compute;:-. The 
increase in the number of flights, the in-
crease in the number of passengers, and 
the increase in air speed gave the airlines 
a quantity of data that became unman-
ageable with the telephone and hand-
written charts; the information had tak-
en on new dimensions. 
As industry and our military have 
changed qualitatively because of their 
growth, so have academic disciplines. 
Never before has the world had so many 
historians, scientists, and technologists, 
causing, as everyone knows, an increase 
in literary output. Because computers 
can deal with information (after all, we 
have a theory which says so) and because 
it is technically possible to reduce the in-
formation contained in the Library of 
Congress to a few cubic yards of film, 
some engineers have asserted that librar-
ies can be reduced to a computer which 
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can be tapped by picking up the phone, 
dialing an appropriate number, and get-
ting an answer as we can now get a re-
corded weather report. 
This may be realizeable some day, but 
remember, there is a difference between 
knowledge and information. The sym-
bols and pictures of books are merely the 
carriers of knowledge. Engineers can 
photograph books, transmit them along 
wires or radio waves, and then retrans-
late them to their original symbols. Not 
one bit of new knowledge has been cre-
ated in this process. Information as in-
formation is useless. Most of us could 
stare at the information contained in a 
book of Chinese characters until we are 
cyanotic and still not be able to get the 
knowledge the information is intended to 
convey. Knowledge, this ineffable some-
thing, to be created from information re-
quires a community of men who work 
toward agreement. Information can be 
stored and retrieved in many novel ways, 
on clay tablets or in computers, but 
knowledge today, tomorrow, and forever 
has to be used and shared or else it is lost. 
Before we place information in a com-
puter memory on a grand scale, we shall 
have to reorganize our communication 
patterns. This reorganization is going on 
today at a much faster rate than many of 
us want to admit. This is taking place 
through socialization and further institu-
tionalization of communication. To illus-
trate what I mean: sixty years ago it was 
still in the tradition for each scholar to 
have his own library. But the day of in-
dividual scholarly libraries is all but 
gone. The quantity of knowledge is now 
so large that the scholar to maintain a 
qualitative grasp of his work must go 
beyond the knowledge available to him 
in his own library. Consequently, ever 
larger and more complex interrelations 
with concomitant bureaucracies are be-
ing formed. 
The reorganization of data for com-
puter storage and retrieval has not been 
undertaken solely by government agen-
cies or industry, but by adventuresome 
groups who expect to make a profit by 
selling a service. One such service is Med-
iphone, which purports to have all the 
pertinent information on the eight thou-
sand drugs now in use in the United 
States. This information, they say, was 
gathered by research teams of physicians, 
pharmacologists, and toxicologists. What 
is ihteresting to note for a librarian 
is that when Mediphone is called for 
knowledge about a drug, the person who 
answers the phone is a physician who is 
supposed to be able to interpret the ques-
tion asked of him and is also supposed to 
be able to evaluate the information given 
in the extensive card files. Here is a new 
kind of library: compiled and gathered 
by scientists and interpreted by scien-
tists for scientists. 
Examining the existing computer in-
formation systems two things are appar-
ent.8 Only when the data or information 
has reached a certain quantity in a nar-
row area does it seem feasible to warrant 
the expense of reorganizing it for com-
puter memories. This may seem obvious, 
nevertheless a good many individuals 
seem to think the day has arrived when 
all existing knowledge with its gaps and 
illogicalities can be put into a computer. 
The other aspect of computer systems 
is the nature of the data and information 
that can be successfully manipulated-
the more abstract the data or informa-
tion, the easier it is to adapt for com-
puter handling. I am juggling words, but 
to get a grasp of applied cybernetics the 
distinction between abstract and con-
crete concepts must be understood. I 
want to reverse completely the usual in-
terpretation of these words. The material-
ist scientist, remember, felt he dealt with 
facts of existence when he reduced what 
he visualized as a regularity in nature 
to mathematical logic. But mathematic 
statements are the most general of gen-
eralities and have little direct relation-
8 John W. Carr, "Better Computers," International 
Scien ce and Technology, No. 3 (March 1962), 35-39. 
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ship to existence. To go back to the ex-
ample of the airlines, the reduction of 
flights to a particular day and hour, 
which are numbers, and to specific quan-
tities of weight and passengers, also num-
bers, leaves out the whole complex opera-
tion of any particular flight: these num-
bers tell nothing about the captain, or 
the Gemutlichkeit of a particular flight 
that the stewardesses stimulated by serv-
ing the passengers champagne. These are 
true experiences of fact. There is nothing 
abstract or numerical about the floating 
sensation one has on deplaning after too 
much champagne. The numbers and 
data organization the airlines have built 
up to keep track of their flights might be 
used to describe missile flights or perhaps 
flights from a beehive. The automation 
of information retrieval is a matter of 
starting from one point which can be de-
fined without ambiguity and arriving at 
another point which is also defineable 
without ambiguity. However, if we try 
to deal with concrete situations, like how 
the captain feels, or what the motives of 
individual passengers are, we cannot 
deduce them from the flight numbers. 
I want to leap now from airline per-
sonnel to books. Every library of any 
size identifies each book with a call num-
ber. One of the fundamental rules of li-
brary operation which is never broken, 
except through error, is that no two 
books will have the same call number. 
The call number does more than identify 
one physical volume from another. Ex-
cept for the few duplicate copies or re-
print editions a library might have, the 
call number also identifies distinct intel-
lectual content. No two books, no two 
journal articles are the same. They are 
the creation of an individual or group. 
Journal editors and book publishers take 
pains, perhaps not enough pains, to see 
to it that anything published is distinc-
tive. Because every book can be identified 
with a "code" number does not mean 
that the essence of the book has been ab-
stracted. One of the basic errors of the 
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engineers and documentalists who try to 
reduce the intellectual content of a li-
brary to a computer memory is their 
failure to see that the call or code num-
ber is not an abstract symbol that can be 
manipulated logically, but stands for 
something concrete and unique-the ex-
perience of the author. 
If we are going to use computers to 
help us with our information problems, 
we should not be wasting our efforts try-
ing to squeeze all knowledge into one 
abstract system, unless we admit that we 
want human beings to be like computers. 
To make good use of computers we have\ 
two tasks before us. One of them already 
has a long tradition. Bibliographers are 
constantly examining published knowl-
edge to locate what appears with a recur-
ring regularity and can be abstracted. 
After all, this is how our reference books 
get organized. The other task will re-
quire new attitudes, if not a new disci-
pline which, incidently, has already been 
named social epistemology.9 \Ve must 
examine the functioning of our academic 
and professional groups to find out what 
kind of information and knowledge they 
use so it can be organized in new and 
different ways, as for example, the work 
of Mediphone which is nothing more 
than an up-to-date Physician's Desk Ref-
erence. 
I should like to end by rephrasing an 
admonition implied in the title of this 
. paper. Mankind, in search for identity, 
first looked to the stars, trees, and ani-
mals. In Western civilization animism 
was replaced by the Greeks and Hebrews 
with gods of the spirit who gave man his 
reason for being. The materialistic scien-
tist brought man to a mechanism whose 
complete functioning could be explained 
by knowing the laws of nature. In mid-
twentieth century, we have a new beast 
we can anthropomorphize, the computer, 
which extends man's horizons, but hard-
ly makes his creativity obsolete. • • 
o Jesse Shera, "Social Epistemology, General Seman-
tics and Librarianship," Wilson Library Bulletin, 
XXXIV (1961), 767-770. 
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